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Abstract: This paper addresses the question of continuity in the long-term devel-
opment of the Japanese tax system, focussing on fiscal reform in the 1930s in
order to assess the impact of war on policy making. Specifically, it tracks the
response of bureaucrats in the Finance Ministry to the challenge of how to
reconcile economic growth with tax increases and redistribution of the burden.
The views of ministerial officials are investigated on the basis of classified docu-
ments issued by the Tax Bureau, which previous research has only partially
examined. The analysis points out that, rather than looking at war as an oppor-
tunity to push through a structural reform, bureaucrats continued to follow policy
guidelines that were rooted in the developmentalist strategy established in the
Meiji period. This conclusion helps to explain the resurgence of some key prewar
features of taxation in the contemporary system, despite wartime reorganisation
and attempts at further reform during the American occupation.
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1 Introduction
Since Joseph Schumpeter laid out the foundations of fiscal sociology in the early
twentieth century, the evolution of tax systems has been studied from a range of
theoretical approaches as an indicator of both socio-economic change and
political power shifts.1 In the case of Japan, scholars have investigated the
development of taxation in an effort to trace the origin of some peculiarities of
the postwar period. The most evident of these features was – and still is, albeit
to a lesser extent – a low fiscal burden in terms of GDP share, compared to that
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1 As a recent collection, see Martin et al. 2009.
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of other industrialised countries.2 Looking more in detail, this situation appears
to have depended upon relatively light extraction of income and the absence
(until 1989) of a general consumption tax.3 These elements were already present
in the prewar era as part of a broader capital-formation strategy, which aimed at
fostering economic growth. These characteristics re-emerged after World War II,
in a time of strong tax increases, despite attempts to carry out a structural reform
during the occupation.4 On the other hand, research has early pointed out that
other aspects of contemporary taxation are a legacy of wartime measures,
particularly the general reform of 1940.5 The lasting effect of innovations
enacted at that time is especially evident in the establishment of an equalisation
system based on the allocation of national taxes, which had a major impact on
the relationship between central and local finance.
Therefore, in order to understand the causes of historical (dis)continuity in
the Japanese tax system, it is necessary to analyse in depth the pivotal phase of
wartime reform. Did policy makers look at radical change as a forced deviation
from the established path? Or did they rather think of war as an opportunity to
create a more efficient and equitable system? Taking the 1930s as timeframe, this
paper tackles these questions by focussing on the higher bureaucracy in the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), which is a key actor in the drafting of legislation. The
following section reviews the literature, pointing at the divergences in the
interpretation of bureaucratic initiative among different authors. Analysis then
proceeds in chronological order: first, the paper illustrates the framework of
reform plans drafted in the early 1930s; next, it discusses the so-called Baba
plan of 1936, which marked a turning point in terms of policy objectives; finally,
it examines tax revision after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the
summer of 1937. On this basis, the conclusion readdresses the issue of continuity
between the prewar, wartime and postwar periods.
2 Planning reform: whose initiative?
The development of Japan’s modern tax system has been the object of a number
of studies, which have placed the accent on the structural defects that derived
2 For long-period OECD data, see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-ratio-
change-all-years.htm.
3 See Jinno 2009: 9–11.
4 See Jinno 1999. For recent research that takes as focal point the Shoup Mission of 1949, see
Brownlee et al. 2013.
5 See, for instance, Hashimoto 1959: 93; Miyamoto 1968: 154.
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from policy decisions made in the Meiji era (1868–1912).6 Jinno Naohiko, in
particular, has shown how the prevalent concern for economic growth led to
heavy imbalances in the distribution of the tax burden, on both vertical (rich/
poor) and horizontal (urban/rural) axes. At the socio-political level, this problem
gave rise to tensions that worsened after the First World War, when the divide
between cities and countryside became evident. Recurrent economic crises in
the following decade further exposed the need for comprehensive reform. The
same lack of elasticity that was at the root of burden inequality caused tax
revenues to lag behind the growth of national income; consequently, natural
increases in revenue proved insufficient to maintain the pace of public
spending.7
Revision of tax legislation was carried out at successive stages in the inter-
war years; these measures, however, were the product of difficult compromises
and failed to solve structural imbalances.8 Over the 1930s the problem became
severe because, in addition to a long-term trend towards budgetary expansion,
other factors contributed to an upsurge of government expenditure. On one
hand, finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo adopted fiscal stimulus to fight
depression at the start of his long tenure (December 1931 to February 1936,
with a five-month interruption in 1934); on the other, a steep rise in military
spending followed the invasion of Manchuria.
Concerning the specific role of the MOF, Jinno has reconstructed the process
that led from tentative drafts in the early 1930s to the enactment of a fiscal
overhaul in 1940.9 In addition to government documents examined by previous
research,10 Jinno drew information from official papers formerly held by a mid-
ranking bureaucrat who had served in the Tax Bureau in 1932–39;11 these
sources fill important gaps in the documentation stored at the National Archives.
Jinno concludes that plans laid in the first half of the decade did not aim at
structural reform, but just at improving the elasticity of the current system;
moreover, the principal measures were conceived as temporary, first to give
6 See especially Miyamoto 1961; Jinno 1979a (Part 1): 131–144.
7 On this point, see also Ide 2006: 262–265.
8 See Kanazawa 1984; Jinno 1985; Ikegami 1991, 1993; Revelant 2013.
9 Jinno 1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1987–88.
10 Ōkurashō Shōwa zaiseishi henshūshitsu 1954, 1957. Hereafter cited as SZS. Documents cited
in this seminal work, which are stored at the National Archives as Shōwa zaiseishi shiryō (SZSS),
have been fully digitalised and can now be consulted online. Search portal at http://www.
digital.archives.go.jp
11 The collection, donated to Tokyo University in 1945, is now preserved as “Hamada Norimi
shiryō” (henceforth, HNS). The numbering of documents cited here follows the catalogue
compiled by Jinno (2000), Part I.
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relief to the middle classes, who already bore the heaviest burden before the
depression; then to increase revenue while recovery was on the way. An initia-
tive for durable reform emerged only in 1936, after the attempted coup d’état of
26 February that claimed the life of Takahashi and other moderate statesmen.
With the military exerting an increasing influence on political affairs, the MOF
drafted a plan that combined a substantive upgrade of revenues with redistribu-
tion of the burden – the latter objective being functional to wartime mobilisa-
tion. This radical project, however, met with strong opposition from business
circles; furthermore, even within the armed forces there were concerns that a
sudden increase in the burden on urban capital might hamper industrial pro-
duction. Therefore, instead of a comprehensive scheme, only temporary tax
hikes were enacted in the next few years, to complement debt financing in a
context of booming military budgets. Conservative opposition gave up only in
1940, once war had made postponement of reform no longer an option.
Building on Jinno’s work, Ide Eisaku has analysed three plans drafted in
1933–34, noting that they included appreciable innovations.12 In particular, Ide
argues that finance officials intended to shape a modern tax system, centred on
progressive personal income tax; the attempt failed because Takahashi rejected
these proposals as premature, sticking to full economic recovery as his policy
priority. It seems that Minister Fujii Sadanobu, who was briefly in charge in
1934, wanted to take steps towards a structural reform. Nevertheless, the nega-
tive reaction of markets reduced this initiative to one, limited measure, which
was the extraordinary profit tax enacted in 1935.
Lastly, there is an essay by Mukai Yurio, which treats the whole interwar
period but touches only briefly on the 1930s.13 Mukai remarks that officials in the
Tax Bureau tried to increase the burden on capital and make taxation more
elastic, even though they lacked support from Takahashi. Their active stance in
favor of a great tax increase would later translate into the Baba plan. This
interpretation is instrumental to Mukai’s thesis that bureaucrats always exerted
influence as policy makers, since even in the 1920s they were able to respond to
the demands of party cabinets in a way that did not conflict with their own
goals.14
Research on tax policy has led, in sum, to considerably different evaluations
of the role played by ministerial officials. The rest of this paper tries to shed light
on the issue by retrieving evidence chiefly from the Hamada collection, which
still contains a large number of unstudied documents. Additional information
12 Ide 2006: 266–269.
13 Mukai 2000: 33–34.
14 Mukai 2000: 32.
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comes from press articles, in order to put the inner working of the Finance
Ministry in context with the movements of markets and public opinion.
3 The early phase: cautious response
Between 1931 and 1934, the Tax Bureau prepared a series of plans for the
revision of Japan’s tax system (Table 1).15 The first one was done on the request
of minister Inoue Junnosuke. It consisted only of a temporary adjustment, after
being stripped of its few innovative elements due to the opposition of the ruling
party. It failed to reach the Diet because of the change of cabinet. In December,
Takahashi formed again a ministerial committee, with an assignment to study a
comprehensive reform aimed at both equality and a net rise in revenue.16
Accordingly, officials drafted proposals for increases by the range of 50 to 300
million yen (with one exceptional proposal reaching 488 millions). It would
have meant an increment of the current tax revenue by about 5–30 per cent,
including revenue from state monopolies and stamp duties. All options focused
on national taxes, leaving to the Home Ministry – as customary – the task of
addressing the problems of local taxation. The Home Ministry, in fact, had
already issued in August 1932 the first operative plan for an equalisation system,
whose primary objective was fiscal relief to rural communities. It can be noticed,
however, that this initiative lacked coordination with the Tax Bureau, as none of
the drafts arranged by the latter assigned an adequate share of national taxes to
the funding of state grants.
Most plans included an appreciable strengthening of income taxation. At the
same time, though, there was the usual reliance on regressive indirect taxes,
especially in the options with higher revenue target. This tendency was slightly
corrected with the introduction of a tax on luxury goods. The most innovative
provisions in some plans above 100 million yen, however, were a general
consumption tax and a “provisional” property tax – again, in the attempt to
strike a balance between the two objectives assigned for the reform. As noted by
Ide, these new items disappeared after Takahashi made his well-known public
statement against tax hikes on 5 July 1933.17 Although the Tax Bureau continued
15 The plan of 1931 is presented in SZS 5: 277–285. Jinno (1979b: 110–113) analyses the plans of
1931, June 1933 (200-million option by Ishiwata and Matsukuma), 24 October 1933 and 24
August 1934; Ide (2006: 266–269) comments on those of June 1933 (150-million option by
Ishiwata and Matsukuma), 24 July 1933 and 24 August 1934.
16 HNS 0-1-1, n. 2, “Kaichō (Ōkura daijin) no aisatsu会長（大蔵大臣）ノ挨拶” [15 April 1933].
17 Ide 2006: 268.
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to draft more modest proposals until October, none of them reached the cabinet.
One of the involved officials, Matsukuma Hideo, later recalled that the minister
rejected the drafts with the argument that it was better to “eat the cow after it
has grown fatter”.18 The situation seemed to change in July 1934, when Takaha-
shi recommended Vice Minister Fujii to take over his post and accomplish the
return to “normal” finance. Under Fujii, the Tax Bureau produced revised plans
that featured a temporary tax on the “exceptional profits of industries of military
supplies and other firms that benefit from the present circumstances”,19 as
previously done during World War I. There was, however, a declining trend in
the overall target: in the end, the only bill submitted to the Diet was that for an
extraordinary profit tax, estimated around 40 million yen. Takahashi, who had
been compelled to come out of retirement to substitute an ailing Fujii, had a
hard time defending a text that seemed to contradict his previous statements.
The bill, nevertheless, cleared both Houses with a few amendments and a formal
request to take care that implementation be not detrimental to business.20
As mentioned above, the failure to enact a comprehensive plan can be
explained as the result of strong external pressure. Rumours of an imminent
tax increase had caused a drop in stock prices in September 1934, followed by a
second wave of financial panic when Fujii, on 29 October, publicly confirmed
that revision was on the way.21 Besides the reaction of markets, however, did
other reasons lead the MOF to self-restraint? From the viewpoint of officials in
the Tax Bureau, what kind of reform would have been most effective? An answer
to these questions can be found in documents relating to the drafts presented
above.
Let us start from a document that raises a basic question: what were the
quantitative margins for tax hikes in Japan?22 A preliminary consideration is that
securing the foundations of public finance with a balanced budget requires
either a reduction of expenses, a rise in taxes or other revenues, or both. If the
goal is to be achieved through higher taxation alone, in light of present condi-
tions and the expected upsurge of defence expenses, “an enormous increment”
in revenue would be necessary. For example, would a 100 per cent tax increase
result in the doubling of revenue (from about 800 to 1600 million yen)? A
18 Hirata 1979: 21.
19 0-1-4, n. 1, “Zeisei seirian 税制整理案”, top secret, 25 July 1934: 5.
20 For a summary of the debate, see SZS 5: 303–314.
21 See press sources quoted in Ide 2006: 270.
22 HNS 0-1-5, n. 41, “Saikei shūshi kinkō to zōzei gendo歳計収支均衡ト増税限度”, top secret,
undated (attached table dated 19 July 1934). An identical copy, not listed in Jinno’s index,
follows n. 43.
Growth Strategy and War 429
detailed estimate indicates that the gain in fiscal 1934, net of losses caused by the
shock to income and consumption, would be 514 million yen.23 The adverse
economic consequences of abrupt tax hikes were further stressed in another
document,24 which pointed out that, since 86.55 per cent of all indirect taxes
and stamp duties were regressive, their increase would hit the lower-income
classes and cause a contraction of consumption; therefore, no major fiscal gain
could be expected from this quarter. Direct taxation had more potential to grow
because it included a share of progressive rates that hit taxpayers with higher
ability; however, as the current revenue from these sources amounted to just 118.7
million yen, an 800-million expansion was unrealistic. In conclusion, the hypoth-
esis of a general doubling of tax rates was ruled out because “it is plainly clear
that it would be utterly unsustainable for the capacity of the national economy”.25
From the above, it appeared to the Tax Bureau that the fundamental problem
was how to bring public finance back on the track of balanced budgeting without
harming the economy. Demonstrating the impossibility of a steady 800-million
increase in tax revenues made an argument – implicit but obvious – that only a
combination of tax hikes and retrenchment would do. This put financial officials in
contrast with the military, above all, as the rise of “defence” spending since the
outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was outstanding. It would also lead to
conflict with those other branches of the administration that were riding the
wave of fiscal expansion. As is well known, in his later cabinet meetings on the
budget Takahashi held his ground against multiple requests for larger budget
allocations. Fujii, too, put up a strenuous fight against his colleagues.26 Given
the premise that a substantive upgrade of fiscal revenues was unavoidable, the Tax
Bureau had to find new revenues within limits such that an increase would not
produce major counter-effects on the economy. It was necessary to consider not
only the scale of tax hikes, but also their qualitative aspects.
Both dimensions of the problem are discussed in an untitled document,
carefully crafted by means of successive additions.27 Analysis starts from the
23 A much lower figure (361 million yen) appears in HNS 0-1-4, n. 26, “Sozei (senbai ekikin o
fukumu) oyobi inshi shūnyū ni jūwari no zōchō o nasu baai no shūnyū mikomigaku taishō hyō
租税（専売益金ヲ含ム）及印紙収入ニ十割ノ増徴ヲ為ス場合ノ収入見込額対照表”, secret, 31
Aug. 1934. The estimate was further revised to 496.3 million yen in HNS 0-1-4, n. 28, same title
as n. 26, top secret, 4 Sept. 1934.
24 HNS 0-1-5, n. 40, “8 oku en zōzei shisan hyō 八億円増税試算表”, top secret, undated.
25 HNS 0-1-5, n. 41.
26 As reported in all major newspapers on 6–22 November 1934. See, for example, Ōsaka
Mainichi shinbun 1934a, 1934b, 1934c, 1934d.
27 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27, top secret, 4 Sept. 1934. It is preceded by a draft with handwritten
corrections. Other versions, apparently earlier drafts, are in 0-1-5, n. 39, 42–45; all top secret,
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remark that an assessment of the limits of the fiscal burden must take into
account the ratio between taxes and national income. To this purpose, recent
data on taxation at both central and local level are provided, for a total of 1602
million yen. Regarding income, precise figures are available for earnings subject
to individual income tax (1824 million yen in 1933), which pertain to about
five per cent of all Japanese households.28 The sum of other personal income
should hence amount to several billion yen, “but these belong by large to
mid-small farmers, fishermen, businessmen in commerce or industry, labourers
and the like”.29 In the light of current claims against heavy local taxation and
the consequent issue of how to provide relief – the paper continues – it is
evident that there is no margin for a large revenue increase from these classes.
Therefore, in case of massive hikes, these will inevitably fall upon the present
income taxpayers. What about corporations, then? Their recent profits amount
to about 880 million yen, including 670 millions that are taxed again as
individual income.30 Hence, levying high rates on the residual sum would not
only fail to bring a great rise in revenue, but also weaken the foundations of
enterprises. As for “2nd type” income (320 million yen), which belongs for
a large part to individuals earning less than 1200 yen per year, the same
reasoning applies as for personal income tax. It remains to consider other capital
income not included in “type 2”; as it consists mainly of yields on treasury
bonds, it is doubtful whether taxing them would be to the advantage of national
interest.31
Having thus reviewed the tax base, and noted that income up to 10,000
yen represents 87.4 per cent of the total for individuals, the document
undated. Only n. 44 has a title: “Waga kuni kokumin shotoku to sozei futan no wariai ni tsuite
我国々民所得ト租税負担ノ割合ニ就テ”. Jinno (1979b: 111–112) quotes one of the untitled ver-
sions. Page numbers cited henceforth have been added later and are part of a longer sequence
that spans over several papers.
28 Details are in HNS, 0-1-5, second doc. after n. 43, “Shōwa 8 nenbun daisan shotoku kaikyū
betsu hyō 昭和八年分第三所得階級別表”.
29 As shown in table “Menzeiten ika no shokugyō betsu jin’in shotoku免税点以下ノ職業別人
員所得” and the preceding, untitled text in 0-1-5, fourth doc. after n. 43. The total private
income estimated for 1934 is 11,188.194 million yen.
30 Before the general reform of 1940, a flat rate was levied on corporate income, called “1st type”;
once paid to stockholders, dividends were subject to progressive rates as personal income (“3rd
type”), net of a 40-per-cent deduction. Income “type 2”, which is mentioned further, consisted of
interest on securities and deposits and was taxed at source at a low flat rate.
31 Bond yields were exempted from income tax during the Russo-Japanese War; they started
being taxed again with the enactment of the capital interest tax in 1926, which applied to all
securities. In this way, the state retained a competitive advantage over local government and
private firms.
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concludes: “If a massive tax increase is enforced, regardless of under whatever
pretext, it is obvious that in the end it cannot but fall heavily on the so-called
middle class between 1200 and 10,000 yen income; moreover, it would force a
burden increase also over income classes below 1200 yen.”32 Further evidence
in support of this argument comes from the details on upper-class incomes:
those above 50,000 yen totalled less than 83 million yen, with only seven
households topping one million. Therefore, even raising rates “to the
extreme”, the base would be too narrow to produce a substantive increase in
revenue.33
Ide, who quotes part of this paragraph, argues that the authors’ conclusion
was that personal income tax would be the most appropriate target for an
increase in tax revenue; this can be considered the first step for the establish-
ment of a progressive, modern tax system.34 However, this interpretation may
overstate the reformist intentions of the authors; after acknowledging that work-
ing-class people lacked the ability to sustain strong tax hikes, while the rich who
could were too few, the document pointed at the negative effects of an aggrava-
tion of the burden on the middle class:
[these] incomes are the core of productive capital, which should grow year by year;
moreover, at present they already bear [here follows a long list of taxes] In case a massive
tax increase is carried out now, [...] it would obstruct the growth of production and there is
a risk that it would destroy the middle class. In this way, the national ability to sustain the
tax burden would decrease and it would be extremely difficult to obtain the tax revenues
expected for the future.35
The above passage suggests that the wisest policy would be gradual cultivation
of the tax base. This concept emerges more clearly in the next paragraph, which
puts the Japanese case in international comparison. With taxes at about 15 per
cent of national income in 1930, Japan occupies “a relatively low position”
between Germany and the United States (Figure 1).36
The first impression, however, is immediately corrected by the following
observations:37
32 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27: 196.
33 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27: 196–197.
34 Ide 2006: 269.
35 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27: 197.
36 A slightly higher figure (16.4%) is given in 0-1-5, Table “Rekkoku ni okeru kokumin shotoku
tai sozei futan no wariai (1930 nen) 列国ニ於ケル国民所得対租税負担ノ割合（一九三〇年）”
after n. 45, undated. A similar document with data for 1932–36 (HNS 3-9-3, n. 4) shows that the
rise in burden in the USA eventually left Japan at the bottom of this ranking.
37 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27: 199–201.
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1. Income per capita is much lower in Japan.38 This means that the national
aggregate is made mainly of low incomes with an “extremely weak ability
to sustain taxation”.39
2. The current tax burden in foreign countries considered is an outcome of
expenses caused by the European War (that is, World War I).
3,4. The economies of these countries “are already close to the limit of devel-
opment”, while capital accumulation in Japan still lags behind them.
Therefore, to raise the tax burden at their same level would hamper
Japan’s economic growth.
5. Public expenditure for social policy, such as unemployment relief, is
relatively low in Japan. One reason is the custom of mutual aid within
families and local communities, which does not appear in tax data but
must draw “a considerable amount” of private money.
All this considered, the tax burden in Japan cannot be defined as particularly
light.
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Figure 1: Taxes in percentage to national income.
Source: HNS, 0-1-4, n. 20, Kokuzeika chōsa gakari 国税課調査係, survey n. 10, “Kakkoku
kokumin shotoku to sozei futan 各国国民所得ト租税負担”, Aug. 1934. Statistical sources for
each country are indicated in the legend of the original table.
38 Calculated in yen for 1930, the respective figures were: Japan 158, France 474, Germany 515,
UK 874, USA 1155. HNS 0-1-5, Table “Kakkoku kokumin shotoku hitori atari (1930 nen)各国国民
所得一人当（一九三〇年）” after n. 45, undated.
39 A similar statement appears in the previous paragraph, where it is also noted that the largest
part of national income was likely spent in the consumption of essential goods. Another survey
shows that the national share of high incomes (4.3%) was considerably smaller than in the
foreign powers, starting from the USA (14.2%). See HNS, 0-1-5, Tables “Kakkoku kazei (shoto-
kuzei) shotoku uchiwake (1928–1929 nen) 各国課税（所得税）所得内訳（一九二八一九二九
年)”: 1 “2 man en o koyuru mono 二万円ヲ超ユルモノ”, 2 “5 man en o koyuru mono 五万円
ヲ超ユルモノ”, after n. 45, undated.
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The last section of the document presents guidelines for future action. The
option of doubling taxes was promptly rejected because of its disastrous con-
sequences on both the economy and fiscal revenue. In addition, it was noted
that the only precedents for such a radical policy were in wartime,40 while
in peacetime taxation must not obstruct the growth of national product, nor stifle the spirit
of enterprise and saving of the people; tax revenues should increase gradually as the state
prospers, together with national income. There is no doubt that this is a good policy.
However, at present the situation of our country is not completely that of peacetime. Of
course it is neither of wartime, though. Therefore, on the one hand we must take in
consideration the growth of production, while on the other we must gather the fiscal
resources to face large expenses.41
The document ends with the statement that, in order to respond to both needs,
a tentative plan for a 300-million-yen tax increase has been drafted and
attached.42 It is a compromise solution, as “a certain sacrifice” will be una-
voidable in terms of economic growth. The quantitative target finds a precise
reason in another document: as the tax burden of the foreign powers con-
sidered averaged 19.35 per cent, Japan’s margin to reach the same level
equalled about 300 million yen.43 Also, in the public debate it was argued
that at least 300 millions would be necessary to offset interest on recent bond
issues.44
At this point, we have enough elements to outline the policy approach of the
Tax Bureau. In the first place, it is clear that a rapid increase in fiscal revenues
was not seen as desirable from the standpoint of either economic competitive-
ness or domestic welfare; it was a second-best choice, forced by a peculiar
situation of “neither peace nor war”. Secondly, it was acknowledged that tax
hikes would fall chiefly upon the productive middle classes, who already bore
the heaviest burden; there seemed to be no immediate prospects for vertical
equalisation. The idea of increasing pressure on corporate income and interest
40 The variation in tax burden for 1894–95 (Sino-Japanese War) and 1904–05 (Russo-Japanese
War) is shown in HNS 0-1-5, n. 39, reference Table 2 [untitled].
41 HNS, 0-1-4, n. 27: 202.
42 This should be HNS 0-1-4, n. 4, “Zeisei seiri (3 oku en)税制整理（三億円）”, top secret, 20
Aug. 1934.
43 HNS 0-1-5, n. 39, note to reference Table 1, “1930 nen ni okeru kokusai heikin ritsu一九三〇
年ニ於ケル国際平均率”. In the main text, this serves to reject either a 800- or 400-million
hypothesis (both shown in ref. Table 3, “1930 nen o hyōjun to seru zōzeiritsu一九三〇年ヲ標準
トセル増税率”).
44 Ogawa 1933: 57.
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on capital got little consideration. Finally, international aggravation of the tax
burden since the Great War – which stands in remarkable contrast with the
reduction occurred in Japan thanks to the wartime boom – was perceived as an
outcome of extraordinary conditions rather than of structural changes in public
finance.
It is not surprising, then, that the plan drafted in October 1934 downgraded
the target from 300 to 70 million yen.45 As mentioned above, even the latter
initiative was aborted before the coming Diet session. A justification appears in a
separate document, which points that economic recovery, still under way, had
been hampered by natural calamities.46 The same document stresses that, as
keeping interest rates low is fundamental to revive the economy, it is not a right
moment for tax hikes on income “type 2” – nor on other kinds of income,
because revision should be comprehensive. Moreover, amendments to national
taxation would require first an adequate study of its balance with local taxes,
which involved issues such as fiscal devolution and the establishment of an
equalisation grant system.47 In short, the Tax Bureau raised many reasons for
not taking action and left decisions to an indefinite future. Some of the obstacles
were temporary, as they related to cyclical factors; others, however, depended
on the socio-economic structure of Japan as a developing country. If fostering
growth and competitiveness was still the priority, it logically followed that the
MOF would not actively champion a structural reform of taxation. In this
respect, there is a neat contrast with the parallel initiatives of the Home and
Agriculture Ministries.
Public opinion, however, seemed to lean towards more energetic policy.
When the Tax Bureau conducted a press survey on the extraordinary profit tax
bill,48 it showed that many commentators were favourable to a drastic reform
and criticised the MOF for failing to solve either the problem of inadequate
revenue or that of burden inequality.
45 HNS 0-1-4, n. 16, “7000 man en teido zōzeian yōkō七千万円程度増税案要綱”, top secret, 19
Oct. 1934.
46 HNS 0-1-4, n. 18, “Ippan zōzei o okonawazaru riyū 一般増税ヲ行ハザル理由”, top secret,
undated. Following heavy rain that flooded the Hokuriku region in July, a typhoon of excep-
tional strength (still remembered as the “Muroto typhoon”) had caused ingent damage in
September.
47 HNS 0-1-4, n. 18,
48 HNS 0-1-13, n. 2–4, “Shinbunshi jō ni arawaretaru rinji ritokuzei ni kansuru hihyō新聞紙上
ニ現ハレタル臨時利得税ニ関スル批評”, Part I–III, 27 Dec. 1935, 15 Jan. 1935, 20 Jan. 1935.
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4 A radical swing and conservative resistance
Coming as the culmination of a series of attempted coups that had shaken the
country since the early 1930s, the 2/26 Incident created the political conditions
for further advance of the military and “reformist bureaucrats” against the old
liberal order. A sign of this turn was the appointment of Baba Eiichi as finance
minister. Normally, for non-party men the choice would have been among
former officials with a long experience in the ministry or central banking.
Baba had served in financial offices for a short period at the start of his career,
but had then climbed the ladder in the cabinet Legislative Bureau (1907–23),
reaching the top post under the Takahashi administration. Appointed Peer by
the next, Seiyūkai-backed cabinet, he had joined the largest group in the Upper
House, the Kenkyūkai. Then, in 1927 another Seiyūkai cabinet had picked him
for the presidency of the Hypothec Bank of Japan. His placement in the political
world, therefore, can be defined as mainstream. However, heading an institution
that was primarily engaged in rural development, Baba came to learn directly
about dire conditions of farmers hit by depression; he then started to advocate
greater commitment of the state in the economy, taking a critical stance towards
established economic thought.49
In line with the new cabinet’s emphasis on national defense and stabilisa-
tion of the people’s living, Baba supported a great expansion of the budget on
an indeterminate basis. As part of this programme, the minister announced that
he would carry out “a radical reform of the tax system” holding both aims of
raising revenue and achieving burden equality.50 A thorough personnel reshuf-
fle, including demotion of the Budget and Tax Bureau chiefs, accompanied this
break away from the policy of his predecessor.51 A ministerial committee, formed
with the participation of officials from the Home Ministry and other branches of
the administration, started working on tax reform in April; by mid-August, a
comprehensive plan was ready for submission to the Diet. According to Matsu-
kuma, who played a key role in the drafting of bills as section chief, Baba was
determined to establish an elastic tax system, able to sustain expenditures in the
event of war – a scenario that might turn real at any time, given the current
49 For a complete biography, see Kurihara 1945.
50 See SZS 5: 343–350. For developments until discussion in the 70th Diet, see ibidem, 350–372.
As the Baba plan is also analysed in Jinno’s articles, only essential information will be given here.
Related documents in HSN occupy most of volume 0-1-7 and all the next three volumes.
51 See Naiseishi kenkyūkai 1971, 1: 103–104. For detailed information, see Senzenki kanryōsei
kenkyūkai/Hata Ikuhiko 1981: 355, 357–359.
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international situation.52 It was easy to comply with this order by retrieving
ideas from previous “exercises” and assembling the pieces.53
The result was more radical than any previous plan. It would strengthen
income tax as the pillar of national taxation, raising rates on corporations by
about 80 per cent and embedding interest on capital into individual income.
Rates on the latter would be remodulated so as to increase the weight on the
upper brackets; at the same time, the tax base would be enlarged by lowering
the exemption point from 1200 to 1000 yen. These measures would bring a total
increase in revenue of about 30 per cent. Revision of other direct taxes would
reduce the burden of small farmers and businessmen. To ensure an equitable
assessment throughout the nation, the prefectural house tax would be nationa-
lised. A property tax would be established as a flat rate on corporations (1.5/
1000) and individuals above a 30,000 yen threshold (1/1000). Another signifi-
cant addition was a tax on transactions in securities. As a counterpart to the
reform of direct taxation, which focused on capital income and property, there
would be higher extraction over a broad base through indirect taxes. This was to
be achieved conventionally by raising excises, as on liquor and sugar, and by
introducing a general sales tax that exempted only some essential goods. The
expected increase in direct and indirect taxes over the next few years was,
respectively, 480 and 130 million yen.
Concerning the relationship between central and local tax levels, the plan
provided for a real revolution:54 besides the transfer of house tax, there would
be a major decrease in surtaxes on land and income and complete abolition of
the controversial household tax, which had long been the symbol of inequitable
extraction in rural districts.55 In all, cuts would amount to about 300 million
yen, or 44 per cent of the present total revenue. In compensation, local govern-
ment would receive a nearly equivalent sum in state grants, whose allocation
would depend on the fiscal needs and ability of each recipient prefectural and
municipal administration. This equalisation system, in turn, would be supported
by the increase in direct state taxes described above. Therefore, net of transfers,
the treasury would boost its revenues of about 320 million yen.
52 SZS 5: 352–353; Hirata et al. 1979, 1: 32.
53 As above. See also Naiseishi kenkyūkai 1971, 1: 121.
54 For a detailed account, see SZS 14: 195–202. A recent analysis is in Takayose 2010: 99–113.
55 Household tax (kosūwari) was assessed on both income and property and represented the
principal autonomous tax of towns and villages. Its reduction, or complete abolition, was a
central issue in tax debates through the interwar period. The reform of 1940 abolished it to
replace it with a lighter resident tax.
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The “Baba plan” received cabinet approval on 22 September; its press
release followed immediately.56 Public debates, however, had been opened
since the spring by official statements and rumours. The gist of discussion can
be reduced to the following points. First, there was a consensus about the goals
of the reform: nobody questioned the inevitability of tax hikes to avoid a rise in
expenditure to be backed entirely by debt; it was also acknowledged that a
redistribution of the burden should accompany such hikes. As the liberal Eko-
nomisuto pointed out, domestic conditions were ripe for the structural changes,
since the failed coups of 15 May 1932 and 26 February 1936 had crippled the
supporters of the status quo.57 It was also remarked that a reform in favour of
farmers, small business and workers would prevent the recurrence of such
“despicable incidents”.58
Precisely because there was a wide front favourable to tax equalisation,
however, those elements of the Baba plan that seemed to contradict this objec-
tive received harsh criticism. Those who expressed appreciation for the rebalan-
cing of direct taxes were also prompt to note that almost all measures for
indirect taxation, together with the lowering of the threshold for individual
income tax, would hit the mid-lower classes.59 It was easy to locate the reason
of this contradiction in the government’s urge to boost revenue, which made
recourse to “mass taxation” unavoidable.60 In this respect, all commentators
basically shared the view of the Tax Bureau – as in the document already
illustrated – about the constraints to tax redistribution that the structure of
national income posed. Pushing further this critique, the Ekonomisuto concluded
that Baba’s effort to achieve a “totalitarian centralisation” of fiscal resources in
view of a possible war was “only full of sacrifice and scarcely effective in
practice”.61
Among the major political forces, the conservative Seiyūkai expressed the
strongest reservations against the Baba plan. In addition to criticism along the
lines mentioned above, the party experts objected that fair assessment of the
property tax would be arduous, while its unrelatedness to income could turn it
into a heavy burden for the middle class.62 This position is best understood as a
56 For a detailed presentation, see Ekonomisuto 1936a, 1936b, 1936f.
57 Ekonomisuto 1936a: 24.
58 Motoyama 1936: 1.
59 See Ekonomisuto 1936b: 24; 1936c: 24; 1936d: 28–29; 1936e: 32–34; Abe 1936: 26–27; Andō
1937. Editorials from the main national newspapers are transcribed in Seiyū 1936. On the
reaction of interest groups and the Socialist Mass Party, see SZS 5: 363–366.
60 Ekonomisuto 1936a: 24; Ōguchi (former parliamentary vice minister of finance) 1936a: 8.
61 Ekonomisuto 1936a: 25.
62 Ōguchi 1936a: 11; 1936b: 18; 1936c: 8–9; Horikiri 1936.
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defence of small landowners, who represented the prime electoral target for the
Seiyūkai; since the 1920s, in fact, a weighty argument against the introduction of
a property tax had been its alleged bias for easily detectable real estate.63 The
party, which had long advocated fiscal decentralisation in support of rural
communities, was also sceptical of the benefits that would derive from suppres-
sion of a large share of local taxation: despite the government’s promise to
provide compensation in grants, the outlook for future growth of this kind of
financing was uncertain.64 Moreover, some executives cautioned the cabinet to
reconsider the timing of tax hikes, since premature implementation might be
counterproductive at both economic and fiscal levels.65
Given these premises, the passage of tax bills through the Diet appeared no
simple task. However, shortly after the opening of the session the cabinet
resigned due to internal disunity. The new premier, General Hayashi Senjurō,
took office on 2 February 1937; the next day, the government withdrew both
budget and tax reform plan, on the grounds that there had been no time for
proper study. The incoming administration thus raised hopes in business circles
that less radical policies would follow. The appointment of moderate Yūki
Toyotarō (a former president of Yasuda Bank, previously holding executive
posts in the Bank of Japan) as finance minister was an encouraging sign,66 as
was the consequent personnel reshuffle: Kaya Okinori, former head of the
Budget Bureau whom Baba had moved to the lesser post of Financial Bureau
chief, became vice minister; Ishiwata Sōtarō was reinstated as Tax Bureau chief
in place of Yamada Tatsuo, who was demoted to Mint director.
The new minister had a package of emergency measures quickly prepared
under the name of the Extraordinary Tax Increase Act. On one hand, this plan
provided for hikes of income tax and other established taxes, particularly those
on capital interest, extraordinary profits and liquors; on the other, it introduced
four taxes selected from the Baba plan (on corporate capital, foreign-currency
bonds, the transfer of securities, and gasoline). Compared to the withdrawn
bills, this scheme did not feature such controversial innovations as the property
63 See Ikegami 1986: 48–49.
64 Ōguchi 1936c: 6; Katō (former parliamentary vice minister for the colonies) 1936: 14.
65 Ōguchi 1936a: 12–13; Yamamoto (former minister of agriculture) 1936. Similar arguments are
already in Ōguchi 1933: 58–59. However, there was also support for tax increases without
further delay (Horikiri 1936), which suggests the existence of some divisions within the party.
66 Ekonomisuto 1937a: 11; 1937b; 1937c: 30. The editor’s opinion, however, was that such
expectations were ill-posed, because the cabinet’s announced programme stood in continuity
with that of the previous administration. The main difference could be that, while Baba would
split tax hikes between rich and poor, Yūki would try to increase the burden on the latter only.
Ekonomisuto 1937b: 13.
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or sales taxes, nor the lowering of individual income tax threshold; it also
expunged the incorporation of “2nd type” income into personal earnings and
other measures that targeted financial capital. It refrained from applying great
pressure on excises, which estimated increase was only of about 40 million yen.
On the whole, nevertheless, expected fresh revenue from national taxes stood at
the remarkable sum of 269 million yen. As this amount was not sufficient to
finance a full-scale system of equalisation grants, cuts to local taxes would not
exceed 70 million yen.67 In this way, minister Yūki put a break on the reformist
rush of the previous administration.
After intense debate, the Diet approved the plan with some amendments
and an attached resolution; the latter included a list of desiderata for more
equitable taxation (as raising the exemption point of the land and business
profit taxes), but also two immediate requests: that extraordinary hikes be
limited to fiscal 1937, and that “an authoritative advisory committee” be formed
soon to lay out a comprehensive reform of the tax system. The Hayashi cabinet,
however, was too short-lived to oversee this task: intolerant of parliamentary
opposition, on 31 March the premier resorted to dissolution of the Lower
House – a move that backfired, because the general election confirmed the
supremacy of the established parties. Hayashi held on to office until June,
when Prince Konoe Fumimaro finally stepped in. Konoe’s appointment raised
great expectations for political stability, as he seemed the right man to hold the
balance of an “iron triangle” of military leaders, big business and political
parties.68 The promotion of Kaya to finance minister upon Yūki’s recommenda-
tion, too, met with a favourable response from business circles. However, the
return of the much-feared Baba as vice premier and home minister signalled that
the reformist camp was still on the offensive – with the immediate effect of
causing a fall in stock prices.69
5 Wartime taxation
In compliance to the Diet’s demand, on 16 July 1937 the Konoe cabinet
appointed an advisory committee to discuss tax reform in view of the next
67 On the Yūki plan and related Diet debates, see SZS 5: 382–410. A detailed explanation is in
Ekonomisuto 1937d. The draft is in HNS, 0-1-7, Part “Rinji sozei zōchō hōan臨時租税増徴法案”.
For comparison with the Baba plan, see Jinno 1981, Part I: 140–143.
68 Ekonomisuto 1937e.
69 Ekonomisuto 1937f, g. Baba, however, resigned in December due to failing health; he was
replaced by admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, a hard-liner faction leader in the navy.
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ordinary session. In order to ensure a broad representation, non-cabinet mem-
bers were selected from both houses of the Diet, business associations and other
interest groups; some prominent economists, too, were to provide their exper-
tise.70 However, it soon became clear that the cabinet wanted to postpone
discussion of reform and quickly enact emergency tax hikes, because of the
renewed outbreak of hostilities with Nationalist China earlier that month. At the
71st special Diet session (25 July–7 August 1937), the government obtained
approval for a gradual increase up to about 100 million yen over 1937–38, to
be drawn chiefly from income tax rate revision and a new levy on dividends; the
manoeuvre also included the imposition of a sales tax on a limited range of
goods.71 All these measures, to be regulated by a North China Incident Special
Tax Act, would raise revenue earmarked for the Special Account for Extraordin-
ary Military Expenses; the latter was created in September, while the battle over
Shanghai raged on. When the tax committee held its first meeting, on 5 Novem-
ber, the cabinet urged members to restrict discussion to minor amendments to
ordinary legislation and wait, for more substantive reform, until normal eco-
nomic conditions be repristinated after settlement of the “Incident”.72 In the
meantime, the MOF drafted an additional plan for temporary taxation, which
would bring the total increase since the summer to about 300 million yen.
Besides the recurrent accent on income and extraordinary profits, there was a
significant upgrade of the sales tax and indirect taxation as a whole. Revenue
from this China Incident Special Tax Act, which the 73rd Diet approved reluc-
tantly in March 1938, was entirely earmarked to finance the ongoing military
operations.
By that point, while resistance continued despite the fall of Nanjing and
other major cities, it appeared to informed observers that chances for rapid
victory were growing thin.73 In the attempt to restrain dependence on debt,
which was rising exponentially, further “temporary” tax hikes for nearly 200
million yen were enacted in March 1939. At the start of the year there had been
another change of premier, but this had not brought disruptive turnover within
70 SZS 5:395. The full list is in HNS 0-0-2, n. 1, “Zeisei chōsakai meibo 税制調査会名簿”, Nov.
1937.
71 See SZS 5: 413–421. Related documents are in HNS, volume 4-0-1, “HokuShi jiken tokube-
tsuzei kankei shorui 北支事件特別税関係書類”. On developments outlined below until 1939,
see SZS 5: 427–466.
72 See Tōkyō Asahi shinbun (TA) 1937b. The main parties had already agreed on this position:
see TA 1937a. For press reports on the other meetings, see TA, 7, 9, 10–12 November; 31 January
1938. The committee minutes are in HNS, 0-0-2, n. 6, 8, 9. The resulting tax adjustments were
enacted in March 1938.
73 Ekonomisuto 1937h.
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the MOF: the top post went to Ishiwata, the former Tax Bureau chief who had
served as vice under Kaya and Ikeda Shigeaki (Seihin). Compared to the pre-
vious years, the proportion between direct and indirect tax increases further
shifted towards the latter (about 105 million yen), raising much criticism in the
Diet. This time, the aim was not only to raise revenue, but also to limit the
consumption of increasingly scarce commodities. Clearly, the claws of war were
closing around the economy. At last, long debate in a mixed-membership
advisory committee (April–October 1939) produced a plan for comprehensive
reform that had many points in common with the Baba proposal; it cleared the
Diet in March 1940.74 The new system provided the foundation for further tax
hikes in the next years, as the war’s toll grew heavier.
As summarised above, for a few years taxation in Japan offered a peculiar
case of parallel legislation: ordinary acts that remained in force with minor
amendments; provisional increases under the Yūki framework, which preceded
the outbreak of total war with China; and extraordinary taxation that related
directly to the military campaigns. How did finance bureaucrats think of such a
situation? Documents in the Hamada collection can help to shed light on the
matter.
In “Considerations on the method of tax increases related to the Incident”,
the Tax Bureau discussed the pros and cons of three alternatives: (a) to
incorporate the tax increase of March 1937 into ordinary acts, while keeping
a separate, temporary legislation to back military expenses; (b) to maintain the
above as three distinct pieces of legislation; or (c) to unify all three.75 The chief
merit of the first option is that it prevented the Yūki increase, “whose content
is unrelated to the Incident and was already necessary from a financial
standpoint”, from being assigned automatically to the special account for the
China campaign. Conversely, as tax acts enacted before and after the outbreak
74 For a synthesis of the committee minutes and public debates, see SZS 5: 493–559. The plan
is presented in SZS 5: 560–590. For further analysis, see Jinno 1981, Part 2; Takayose 2010:
115–162.
75 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 13, “Jihen kankei zōzei no hōhō ni kansuru kōsatsu事変関係増税ノ方法ニ関
スル考察”, top secret, Oct. 1937. Option (a) also appears separately in HNS 0-1-12, n. 2, “Kihon
zeihō to rinji sozei zōchōhō to o ikkatsuhō shi betsu ni rinji rippō toshite jihen kankei no zōzei o
rippō suru an 基本税法ト臨時租税増徴法トヲ一括法シ別ニ臨時立法トシテ事変関係ノ増税ヲ
立法スル案”, secret, undated. The latter document is followed by a draft copy with an alter-
native plan attached (HNS 0-1-12, n. 3, “(Betsuan) Shina jihen rinji zōchō hōan（別案）支那事
変臨時増徴法案”, undated), which proposes to merge the Yūki increase with China-related tax
hikes, but keep them separate from ordinary acts. This solution is also discussed as an
alternative to complete separation in HNS, 0-1-12, n. 7, “Zōzei no jiki o i ni suru baai ni okeru
zeisei kaisei hōhō ni kansuru kōsatsu増税ノ時期ヲ異ニスル場合ニ於ケル税制改正方法ニ関ス
ル考察”, secret, undated.
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of the Incident “differ in aim and nature”, it would not be appropriate to merge
them. The Yūki increase was, in fact, “nothing but a revision of fundamental
legislation” that was presented as provisional for lack of adequate time during
the Diet session. The remaining alternative avoided the technical problems
involved in the merger of laws, but in the end made the tax system more
complicated. The plan finally published by the MOF, which adopted the “all-
separate” option,76 was therefore a compromise between the Tax Bureau’s
preferred solution – incorporation of the Yūki plan only into ordinary legisla-
tion – and the one to be avoided, that is, a grand merger that would blur the
line between permanent and emergency taxation, to the advantage of the
military.
The next question, then, is to what extent measures enacted under Minister
Yūki matched the durable arrangement that the Tax Bureau envisioned for the
post-war period. From a quantitative standpoint, there is evidence that “for the
coming tax adjustment” the aim was to make permanent the revenue increase
obtained in early 1937. Hikes beyond that level, instead, were a temporary
necessity.77 Concerning the redistribution of the burden, however, there were
no clear guidelines: while “to implement an adjustment that brings major
changes to the tax system is impossible at present”, the only conclusion about
prospective measures studied over the previous years was that “these are issues
that involve much debate also in peacetime”.78 The view about reform was not
just that war has distorted both fiscal and economic conditions and that it was
necessary to wait until these would be “back on a normal track”;79 a detailed
review of possible innovations also placed the accent on their intrinsic defects.80
A property tax would be difficult to assess in a fair way and would provide a
relatively small revenue compared to its administrative cost. Alternatively, a
schedular income tax would bring abundant revenue, but might fall heavily on
“the general masses” – especially urban labourers so far not subject to house-
hold tax – because of its low threshold and flat rates. Unified taxation of “2nd-
type income” and other personal income would produce negative effects on
capital yields and the placement of bonds.
76 TA 1938.
77 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 16, “Zeisei seiri hōshin ni tsuite 税制整理方針ニ就テ”, secret, undated.
78 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 16: 4.
79 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 16: 2.
80 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 11, “Zeisei kaisei ni kansuru shuyō mondai税制改正ニ関スル主要問題”, top
secret, 1 Nov. 1937. Similar comments are in HNS, 0-0-2, n. 14, “Kōkyūteki zeisei seiri o kono sai
okonau koto no konnan naru jijō 恒久的税制整理ヲ此ノ際行フコトノ困難ナル事情” (marked
“Saigoan 最後案”), top secret, 26 Oct. 1937: 13–15.
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With respect to local taxation, nationalisation of the prefectural house tax
was considered prone to criticism as detrimental to local autonomy. As for the
abolition of household tax, this would require in compensation some durable
and elastic resources, as a higher income surtax; however, since for future
national tax increases there was no choice but to focus on income tax, it
would be difficult to impose a heavy surtax. Household tax could also be
replaced by state transfers or decentralisation of national taxes, but then the
problem would be how to compensate for the loss at central level – leading back
to the question of property tax and special income tax. Another possibility
would be the introduction of a general turnover (consumption) tax; this, how-
ever, would cause a hike in prices and provide unstable revenue, being depen-
dant on fluctuations of the economy.
It seems, therefore, that finance bureaucrats remained at best cautious towards
the prospects of structural reform. A certain continuity, nevertheless, can be
detected between wartime measures and long-term policy from the standpoint of
inequality reduction.81 Since 1935, tax increases had targeted mainly corporations,
businessmen and the holders of financial assets, leading to an attenuation of the
horizontal bias. Measures submitted to the 73rd Diet went again in this direction
(Figure 2). Officials noted that the urban/rural imbalance, “which had been a core
problem in the adjustment of the tax system”, in recent times had shrunk con-
siderably thanks to both legislative action and a rising trend in the price of
agricultural products. For the future, the recommendation was to leave the rural
populace out of the target of tax hikes, so as to further improve equality.82
6 Conclusion
Classified documents of the Tax Bureau offer precious insight into the planning
of fiscal policy in the 1930s. On one hand, it is possible to trace a change in the
attitude of officials towards budgetary expansion. By 1937, what had been
initially considered a temporary trend became accepted as a structural
81 Numerous surveys on this issue were submitted to the advisory committee of 1937. See HNS,
0-0-1, n. 1, Ōkurashō shuzei kyoku, “Zeisei chōsakai (dai ikkai) futan chōsa kankei shiryō 税制
調査会（第一回）負担調査関係資料”, secret Nov. 1937; HNS, 0-0-1, n. 3, Ōkurashō shuzei
kyoku, “Zeisei chōsakai (dai ikkai) kankei sankō shiryō 税制調査会（第一回）関係参考資料”,
Nov. 1937; HNS, 0-0-1, n. 4, Shuzei kyoku kikakuka, “Shōwa 11 nenbun sozei kōka futan
narabini kakeihi shishutsu (fu shōhizei) jōkyō shirabe 昭和十一年分租税公課負担並家計費支
出（附消費税）状況調”, secret, 1937.
82 HNS, 0-0-2, n. 14, 10–11.
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upgrading of public spending. In this respect, Japan was proceeding in the same
direction as the leading industrialised countries, where socio-economic trans-
formations since the First World War were leading to the crisis of the liberal
model of “small government”. Although war grew into the principal force
inflating budgets, finance bureaucrats viewed this factor as fundamentally
different from structural change. Even after the outbreak of all-out conflict
with China, policy analysis remained tied to the idea of a “return to normality”
in the long term. At the operative level, this objective was pursued by keeping a
neat separation between the tax increase of March 1937 – which should be
embedded in ordinary legislation – and provisional hikes that served to finance
the war effort. Though largely ineffective, this decision was a significant act of
resistance against military encroachment over public finance.
On the other hand, documents on the structure of taxation reveal a basic
continuity with the developmentalist thought of the Meiji period. While the issue
of burden inequality received a certain attention, it is clear that the priority goal
remained that of supporting Japan’s international advance as an industrial
power. Therefore, despite the acknowledgement that income taxes were the
only fiscal resource adequate to sustain the gradual growth of government
spending, there was no enthusiasm for a radical shift of the burden towards
the urban and corporate sectors of the economy. This approach diverged from
that of the Home Ministry, whose commitment to the rural question was closely
linked to its institutional role of ensuring public order and efficient administra-
tion at the local level.
The question, then, is how to explain the breakaway from a conservative
track at two successive moments, that is the Baba plan of 1936 and the general
0
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Figure 2: Estimated effects of tax revision on the average burden of each profession.
Source: HNS, 3-9-3, n. 7, “Zōchō zengo ni okeru sozei kōka futan hikaku 増徴前後ニ於ケル租
税公課負担比較”, secret, Feb. 1938. Average of eight income brackets between 400 and 5000
yen. Estimated effect of the Extraordinary Tax Increase Act, the China Incident Special Tax Act
and revision of the taxable value of land.
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reorganisation of 1940. The latter can be understood in light of the enormous
pressure for reform exerted by war at that stage, in both financial and social
terms. The fact that legislative approval arrived only after a decade of discussion
(not to consider previous debates in the 1920s) is a telling sign of the resilience
of the established order. The former rupture point, however, requires further
reflection on the political role of the bureaucracy. With the fall of the last party
cabinet in 1932, career officials certainly regained ascendance as policy makers.
Moreover, after Takahashi’s demise there was a substantial hierarchical unity in
the MOF, as observed here in the careers of Kaya and Ishiwata. Minister Baba
represented an exception, as did later Mitsui CEO Ikeda Seihin (May 1938–
January 1939) and former secretary-general of the Minseitō party Sakurauchi
Yukio (January-July 1940), under whom tax reform was finally enacted. Baba’s
appointment, in particular, had the character of a hostile takeover that produced
immediate effects on both personnel and policy guidelines. It has been shown,
however, that this radical swing soon gave way to an accommodation of inter-
ests that better suited the polycentric structure of power.
In a broader perspective, the persistence of strong linkages between the
Finance Ministry, the party in government, and business circles in the postwar
era can help explain the resurgence of some pre-reform features in the national
tax system. The elements that re-emerged, such as a preference for low fiscal
pressure, were those most functional to the process of catch-up with more
advanced economies. Therefore, it can be concluded that the postwar tax regime
was born as a synthesis of deeply-rooted developmentalism and a relatively
recent concern for redistributive issues.
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